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SHOULD INJURY OR DEATH FROM HEAT STROKE BE
COfPENSABLE UNDER THE KENTUCKY
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT?
Section 1 of the Kentucky Workmen's Compensation Act
provides in part, "It (the Act) shall effect the liability of ther
employers subject thereto to their employes for personal injur-
ies sustained -by the employe by accident arising out of and in
the course of the employment, or for death resulting from such
accidental injury; provided, however, that personal injury by
accident as herein defined shall not include diseases except where
the disease is the natural and direct result of a traumatic injury
by accident, nor shall they include the results of a pre-existing
disease, but shall include injuries or death due to the inhalation
in mines of noxious gases or smoke, commonly known as 'bad
air', and also shall include the injuries or death due to the in-
halation of any kind of gas.'1
In the case of Smith et aZ v. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co.,2
an employe was working in defendant's foundry. The employe
was examined by defendant's physician and found to be in good
health. The employee worked during the day until 4:45 p. m.
Hfe walked home with a co-employe and complained of feeling
tired. By seven o'clock that evening he was delirious. His tem-
perature rose to 107 degrees. He died the next morning. The
evidence showed that the employe, while in the course of his
employment, was exposed to excessive heat due to the inclosed
nature of the building and to the melted metal handled, there.
It was found as a fact that the employe died from a heat stroke.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals denied the claimants compensa-
tion on the ground that heat stroke was not an accident, but a
disease which did not arise from a traumatic injury by accident.
This case represents the law in Kentucky at the present time on
the point involved.
The writer proposes to show that the facts of the above
case warranted compensation to the claimants. In order to do
this it will be necessary to show (1) that "heat stroke" is a per-
sonal injury sustained by accident, or (2) assuming that "heat
stroke" is a disease, to prove that it results from trauma. The
'Kentucky Statutes, sec. 4880
2211 Ky. 454, 277 S. W. 806 (1925)
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court admitted that the injury arose out of and in the course of
employment.
"Accident" ig defined in Webster's International Diction-
ary as being, "An event that takes place without one's foresight
or expectation; an undesigned, sudden, and unexpected event;
an undesigned and unforeseen occurrence of an afflictive or un-
fortunate character." It is a matter of common knowledge
that heat stroke is a sudden and unexpected event. There is
a conflict of authority, however, as to whether heat stroke is a
disease or an accidental personal injury. In the field of medi-
cine heat stroke is usually considered as a disease.3 Injury
from heat stroke is generally considered to be an injury by ac-
cident within the meaning of Compensation Acts, and compen-
sation therefor is awarded in a majority of the jurisdictions
having Compensation Acts, if the employe was especially ex-
posed to excessive heat by reason of his employment. 4
In Young v. Western Furniture and Mfg. Co.,5 the employe
was working in a corrugated steel building with a tar roof. The
building was also inadequately ventilated. Due to his expos-
ure to the excessive heat in the building the employe received a
heat stroke, from the effects of which he died. In discussing
the case the court said, "The death was an accident in the
sense that it was unexpected, and was not such a result as would
naturally follow the" employment, but grew out of it and the de-
cedent died because of it." Compensation was awarded to the
claimant. In the case of Hernon v. Hoain et al.,6 the em-
ploye became overheated while unloading lumber and death
resulted. The court held that death was accidental and resulted
from heat stroke. The court awarded the claimant compensa-
2 See Dozier v. Fideiity & Casualty Co., 46 Fed. 446 (1891).
4 Ismayv. Williams, 77 L. J. P. C. N. S. 107 (1908), an English case;
Matis v. Schaeffer, 270 Pa. 141, 113 At. 64 (1921); State v. District
Court, 138 Minn. 250, 164 N. W. 916 (1917) ; Kanscheit v. Garrett Laun-
dry Co., 101 Neb. 702, 164 N. W. 708 (1917); Walsh v. River ,Spinning
Co., 41 R. I. 490, 103 At. 1025 (1918); Joliet v. Industrial Commission,
291 Ii. 555, 126 N. E. 618 (1920); Ahern v. Spier, 93 Conn. 151, 105 Atl.
340 (1918); Texas Employer's Ins. Assn. v. Moore, 279 S. W. 516 (1925);
Townsend & F. Co. v. Taggart, 144 N. E. (Ind.) 556 (1924); Skelly Oil
Co. v. State Industrial Commission, 91 Okla. 194, 216 Pac. 233 (1923);
Pace v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 201 N. W. 348
(1924). See L. R. A. 1916A 23; L. R. A. 1918F 936; 20 A. L. R. 42;
40 A. L. R. 402; 46 A. L. R. 1218.
'101 Neb. 696, 164 N. W. 712 (1917Y
'169 N. Y. Supp. 705 (1918)
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tion under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The case of
Days v. Trimmer,7 presents an analogous situation. In that
ease the claimant was employed by defendant to carry coal. On
a very cold and stormy day, while claimant, wearing only a
pair of very thin gloves, was engaged in carrying coal; all his
fingers and toes were frostbitten. The court in discussing the
case said, "Beyond question the injuries sustained by the claim-
ant in the case at bar were accidental, within the meaning of
the Workmen's Compensation Law." Compensation was
awarded to the claimant. In the case of Ismay v. Wiliams,
supra, a workman, while in a weakened physical condition, was
raking ashes from beneath the boiler in a stokehole, and re-
ceived a heat stroke which resulted in his death. In discussing
that case Lord Loreburn used the following language, "To my
mind the weakness of the deceased which predisposed him to
this form of attack is immaterial. The fact that a man who
has died from a heat stroke was, by physical debility, more
likely than others so to suffer can have nothing to do with the
question whether what befell him is to be regarded as an ac-
cident or not . . . In my opinion this man died from an ac-
cident. What killed him was a heat stroke, coming suddenly
and unexpectedly upon him while at work. Such a stroke is
an usual effect of a known cause, often, no doubt, threatened,
but generally averted by precautions which experience in this
instance had not taught. It was an unlooked-for mishap in
the course of his employment. In common language it was a
case of accidental death." Honnold says, "The general rule
drawn from the English cases is that where the accident is due
to the forces of nature which might have been foreseen, there is
an aggravation of the danger if the workman is more exposed
as a result of his employment than the ordinary man, and if the
danger is increased by reason of the employment, the em-
ployer is liable for compensation for disability from sunstroke,
freezing and lightning. These are forces of nature which he
cannot foresee and prevent, and the employe is ordinarily no
more subject to injury from such sources than are others. But
where the work and the method of doing the work expose the
employe to the forces of nature to a greater extent than he
would be if not so engaged, the industry increases the danger
7162 N. Y. Supp. 603 (1916)
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from such forces and the employer is liable." s  Dosker makes
the following statement on the subject under discussion, "In-
juries from heat and cold, such as sunstroke, heat prostration,
freezing and frost bite, caused by the severity of the natural
elements are not generally held to be accidents arising out of
and in the course of the employment, unless the nature of the
employment is such that those dangers are one of the natural
hazards connected with it.' '
These above cases and citations are representative of the
weight of authority that, within the meaning of Compensation
Acts, heat stroke is not regarded as a disease, but as a personal
injury by accident. Granting that the Kentucky Court of Ap-
peals is correct in holding that heat stroke is a disease and not
a personal injury by accident, compensation for injury or death
therefrom can be awarded under the Kentucky Act by holding
that the "disease" results from a traumatic injury by accident.
The foregoing cases seem to establish the conclusion that heat
stroke is accidental, whether it be considered as a personal
injury or as a disease. It now remains to be shown that heat
stroke results from trauma. "Trauma" is defined in The Cen-
tury Dictionary and Cyclopedia as being, "An abnormal con-
dition of the living body produced by external violence." By
making a subtle, yet reasonable, analysis of the "disease" it
may well be said that its cause is traumatic. The cause of heat
stroke is the expogure to heat of such intensity that its strength
and force are sufficient to overpower and paralyze the.vital cen-
ters of the body. In the case of State v. District Court, supra,
an employe was shovelling sand upon an open street, and due to
the humidity of the air, and the direct rays of the sun, the
employe suffered a heat stroke. The court ruled that heat
stroke was a personal injury caused by accident within the
meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act. In discussing
the case the court said, "The intense heat of the sun, associated
with the humidity of the atmosphere emanating from the wet
sand, as an external cause, was a violent agency, in the sense
that it worked upon decedent so as to cause his injury and death.
The conclusion that his death was by violent and external means
3 Honnold on Workmen's Compensation, page 428, as quoted in
Fifth Ky. Leading Decisions, page 60.
'Dosker's Manual of Workmen's Compensation, page 113.
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is inevitable. That his death was unnatural imports a violent
agency as the cause."
In Hollenbachk Co. v. Hollenback,10 the Court of Appeals
of Kentucky says that the act should be liberally construed with
a view to effectuating the intention of its makers. To hold that
injury or death from heat stroke is not compensable is, it seems,
a strict construction of the Act. And the Kentucky Court of
Appeals, by adopting this view, has diverted from the main
current of authority and wandered afar from the humane pur-
pose for which the act was passed. It seems that the class of
workmen whose employment subjects them to great heat and
who sometimes succumb to such heat are especially in need of
the protection of the Compensation Act. The Kentucky Act
expressly allows compensation for injury or death from inhala-
tion in mines of poisonous gas. It is submitted that from the
standpoint of reason and justice, an employe who is injured by
being exposed to air which is saturated with poisonous gas, is
no more entitled to compensation for such injury than is the
employe who is injured by being exposed to air that is freighted
with deadly heat.
J W Jo S.
10181 Ky. 262, 204 S. W. 152 (1918)
